Class on November 28th… At the end of the last class we discussed what Fink sees as the central question of phenomenology: the origin of the world. This marks a considerable expansion of phenomenology from the way Husserl originally conceived it; Fink claims phenomenology is concerned with everything, whereas Husserl originally envisioned the philosophy as a ground for the sciences. At first, any “answers” to the question of the origin of the world seem wildly speculative, and purely the domain of theology. Yet for Fink the failure of the responses does not eliminate the question itself, and phenomenology, in Fink’s estimation, merely poses it again. Telling me that the world is created because of x, y, and z doesn’t tell me why the world is created, rather it seeks the meaning of the origin of the world in being that are world immanent. To claim that the world is created because of beings is, of course, redundant, or results in a reductio ad infinitum.
By “origin” we mean something that is world transcendent and creative. Just as the God in Augustine has to be outside of the “world” and time to create it, so too does Fink conceive the “origin” of the world in this case. It is something transcendant yet grounding. Yet Fink’s phenomenological response is not explicitly mythological. If this discussion reminds you of a theological one, it is imperative to understand that Fink does not talk about an “origin” as a primary, singular creation ex-nihilo, something that happened along time ago, and provided the groundwork for the “world” that we know “today.” This is patently unphenomenological. What phenomenology proposes as the world-transcendent ground is instead sense-donation. We recall that Husserl develops the transcendental ego as being that which bestows sense upon the world, thereby making the world intelligible, or, to put it more succinctly, thereby making the World. In this sense, we can think about “origin” as a constant creation from this transcendent ego. The question “why is there the world?” is for Fink the same as asking “why is there meaning?,” and leads us directly to the transcendental ego.
Whence our second point in class, the possibility of “entering” the phenomenological attitude. The “paradox of beginning” as we discussed in class is just this: How do we move from the Natural Attitude into the transcendental, phenomenological one? How is it possible to make this movement? Fink’s response, interestingly, is the same as Aristotles: phenomenology begins with wonder. For Fink the moment of drawing back from the Natural Attitude comes part and parcel with standing in wonder at the fact that there is meaning. While the Natural Attitude is structured primarily by belief, or, more appropriately, acceptance and habitation of the meaning of the world, the meaning of the world as such becomes evident, or at least “wonderful” in the phenomenological attitude.
Fink closes his essay with a short bit on language, posing another question directed at the phenomenological/natural attitude divide. How is it possible to “speak” in the phenomenological attitude? All of the words one brings up in the supposedly divorced and transcendental attitude are ultimately Natural in character. Furthermore, they function naturally, and arrive naturally in the phenomenological attitude. How then, can we think of a phenomenological attitude apart from the Natural attitude it wishes to move beyond? What is unacceptable for Fink is a “transcendental language,” such a formal logic. Phenomenology is concerned with meaning, and, for Fink, concerned with talking to the “dogmatist,” or the Natural Attitude, so how can ably extricate itself from that attitude whilst retaining the capability for an exchange?
These are big and interesting problems, probably the most interesting ones we have discussed in the context of Husserl, and I would love to have people contribute. What is the difference between the phenomenological and the natural attitude, especially with repsect to their languages? How does Fink understand creation?
With respect to the problem of language, can we conceive of a phenomenological attitude apart from the natural attitude? Hm. I am glad to engage this post as I am kind of obsessed with problems of utterances…so pardon me while I free-associate here.
I don’t really know how to intelligently address the problem of language in the phenomenological attitude. However, for me, there has always been an inherent naivety to language. What comes to mind to me right now is problem of language in a reading of Lévinas. That is, roughly speaking, how can we talk about the infinitely Other in a language of finitude? I bring this up because I think, with language, there is always a story of betrayal to be told. With respect to language, the natural attitude becomes inextricable from the phenomenological – and this is unacceptable. And, as you say Jonathan, it is not as though some sort of permutation can exist (i.e., a “transcendental language”).
In any case, and this is an issue I’m thinking about for a paper in the Derrida class, the thing about language (in particular, I think) is that there is always a promise. Even in its naivety, an utterance always carries with it a promise of meaning. So, for me, there is some possibility in language and that possibility lies in the potentialities of language. What does this mean for Fink’s problem? I guess we’re sort of stuck with the natural attitude…but I think one would be fundamentally mistaken to say that we’re not “getting at” something inherently phenomenological even when we “speak” in the language of the natural attitude.
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I can’t understand what is so paradoxical about Fink’s language related-paradoxes. Throughout his rejoinder to Criticism, Fink repeatedly intones why it was inevitable that Criticism would have misunderstood Husserl’s phenomenology: they tried to understand it as a philosophical position, as a theory, rather than through an enactment of the reduction themselves. For Fink, undergoing the transformation brought with the reduction is, indeed, the only way to appreciate the true nature of phenomenology and its analyses. Thus, naturally, the phenomenologist would not be capable of presenting a phenomenological analysis to the “dogmatist” and have it be understood—such is the nature of the dogmatist’s naivete. All the phenomenologist could and should hope for would be to in some way motivate the dogmatist to perform the reduction, so that they could communicate with one another. This all seems very common sensical. So where’s the paradox?
So, as per Fink’s identification of the primary reduction-motivating force as a sense of “astonishment” or “wonderment” at how the world takes on meaning, should the phenomenologist just go around attempting to “astound” dogmatists out of their dogmatism? But if so, does not Fink, in responding to Criticism at length regarding the contents of phenomenological analysis, contradict this guidance? If we take a sense of astonishment as the only way of motivating the reduction, then I think Fink does contradict himself. But I think, and I assume from the contents of Fink’s essay that he also thinks, that the reduction could be motivated by pointing to the rewards of it: “Want to know the origin of the world? Well, I’ll tell you how it’s done. Interested?” “Well, of course I’m interested. I’ve been wanting to know the origin of the world for a mighty long time now.” And of course we could conceive of many other strategies for motivating the reduction. Thus, the phenomenologist must skillfully employ and innovate such strategies—which admittedly are expressed in the mundane terms of the natural attitude—not in order to directly expound the insights of phenomenology to those who by nature would be incapable of understanding, but in order to motivate all the dogmatists into seeing for themselves. Right?
it’s probably just because i’m writing my paper on it, but this discussion of the finitude of language immediately reminds me of heidegger’s claim as to why science would have no interest in ‘the nothing.’ it makes perfect sense for an institution whose only interest is in beings and their interaction with each other to deem something outside of those beings a ‘nullity.’ if i understand desiree and noah’s posts correctly, for a phenomenologist to be preoccupied with creating a ‘transcendental language’ is essentially the same thing. heidegger does not take it upon himself to convince science of the importance of the nothing, because it is not a discussion that follows the logical or non-cyclical analysis attributed to the scientific method…it is to be addressed by an ‘institution’ that ‘begins with wonder’