George A. Schrader attempts, in his article “The Structure of Emotion,” to use the theory of phenomenology to concretely define human emotion. He begins this definition through a short analysis of the words “feeling” and “emotion,” applying the Heideggarian concept of the structure of language to these two basic words so crucial to human existence. He goes on to ask two fundamental questions pertaining to the phenomena of feeling: (1) What is the intrinsic form or structure of feeling? (2) How is feeling related to other conscious processes of the human subject such as thought or volition?
Schrader faults Husserl’s curriculum of phenomenological description as being a theory that can never be considered as a complete program for philosophy because Husserl maintains that phenomena are accessible to analysis independently of language. It is Heidegger, in Schrader’s mind, who brings the concept of language to the forefront of phenomenological inquiry, as language is indispensable for the investigation of the world in the phenomenological context.
The application of phenomenological description to Schrader’s quest for a definition of human feeling begins with what he considers to be the fundamental differences between “feeling” and “emotion.” He states that while feeling can be taken to mean “I think” in our language and, thus, is often related to experience, emotion is a distinct kind of feeling, one that is intense, and acts as a part of consciousness. As such, it is also a form of self-awareness. Webster’s dictionary defines feeling (and thus, emotion) as a “state of consciousness considered without reference to an object,” and Schrader is quick to point out how feeling has been regarded as such throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. However, he continues to allude to the use of feeling in our language where typically we use the verb “to feel” in reference to an object. Using the examples of melancholy and anxiety, Schrader shows his readers that while melancholy or anxiety are considered forms of awareness; one can be “unhappy” about the state of affairs in the world or “anxious” about another’s fate.
In order to truly explore the intrinsic meaning of feeling, Schrader believes one must ask the question, “What is feeling the feeling of?” To delve into this question, Schrader chooses to exemplify anger as a feeling that is “primitive.” Is anger a conscious state of the subject through which he is oriented toward an object in his world? Is anger a determinate way in which the subject exists in the world? To an angry man there can be no doubt that words cannot suffice to express the range or intensity of that emotion. For him to have a felt meaning to express, the feeling as immediate must have some measure of determinacy, and that requires it to have some degree of structure. This angry man must then be aware of his anger and of the objects that cause anger in whatever situation has resulted in this “primitive” feeling. Schrader demonstrates how thought and volition are necessary in the development of feeling saying, “An adequate theory of emotion must be able to account for the possibility that anger can become rage and rage can turn into defiance.” Without thought and volition, as key elements above self-awareness, feeling cannot fully occur.
Bringing the concept of feeling and emotion back to Heidegger, Schrader shows us the insistence of Heidegger upon the “mood,” or Gestimmtsein, of the total individual as primary for an understanding of his world. This “mood” is not a mere psychological feeling but a mode of being-in-the-world. The primary understanding of being is through that fundamental mood which characterizes the original being of Dasein. Thus, we must stop associating feeling and emotion with a simple state of self-awareness separate from thought and volition, but must instead develop ourselves as complete human beings, for it is only through interpretation of feeling through thought that one can fully complete his or her world.
